HISTORY
OF
SCIENTIFIC IDEAS.
VOLUME I.
Cambridge:
PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
HISTORY
OF
SCIENTIFIC IDEAS.
By WILLIAM WHEWELL, D.D.,
MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.
BEING THE FIRST PART OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.
THE THIRD EDITION.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
ΛΑΜΠΑΔIΑ ΕΧΟΝΤΕΣ ΔIΑΔΩΣΟΥΣIΝ ΑΛΛΗΛΟIΣ
VOLUME I.
LONDON:
JOHN W. PARKER AND SON, WEST STRAND.
1858.
PREFACE TO THIS EDITION.
THE Chapters now offered to the Reader were formerlypublished as a portion of The Philosophy of the InductiveSciences, founded upon their History: but the nature andsubject of these Chapters are more exactly described by thepresent title, The History of Scientific Ideas. Forthis part of the work is mainly historical, and was, infact, collected from the body of scientific literature, atthe same time that the History of the InductiveSciences was so collected. The present work contains thehistory of Science so far as it depends on Ideas;the former work contains the same history so far as it isderived from Observation. The leading features inthat were Theories inferred from Facts; the leadingfeatures of this are Discussions of Theoriestending to make them consistent with the conditions of humanthought.
The Ideas of which the History is here given are mainly thefollowing:
Space, Time, Number, Motion,Cause, Force, Matter, Medium,Intensity, Scale, Polarity,Element, Affinity, Substance,Atom, Symmetry, Likeness, NaturalClasses, Species, Life, Function,Vital Forces, Final vi Causes,Historical Causation, Catastrophe andUniformity, First Cause.
The controversies to which the exact fixation of these Ideasand their properties have given occasion form a large andessential part of the History of Science: but they also forman important part of the Philosophy of Science, for noPhilosophy of Science can be complete which does not solvethe difficulties, antitheses, and paradoxes on which suchcontroversies have turned. I have given a survey of suchcontroversies, generally carried from their earliest originto their latest aspect; and have stated what appeared to methe best solution of each problem. This has necessarilyinvolved me in much thorny metaphysics; but such metaphysicsis a necessary part of the progress of Science. The humanmind deriving its knowledge of Truth from the observation ofnature, cannot evade the task of determining at every stephow Truth is consistent with itself. This is the Metaphysicsof Progressive Knowledge, and this is the matter of thispresent History.
Of the re