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From October to Brest-Litovsk
By Leon Trotzky
Authorized Translation from the Russian
1919
1. In this book Trotzky (until near the end) uses the Russian Calendarin indicating dates, which, as the reader will recall, is 13 days behindthe Gregorian Calendar, now introduced in Russia.
2. The abbreviation S. R. and S. R.'s is often used for"Social-Revolutionist(s)" or "Socialist-Revolutionaries."
3. "Maximalist" often appears instead of "bolshevik," and "minimalist"instead of "menshevik."
Events move so quickly at this time, that it is hard to set them downfrom memory even in chronological sequence. Neither newspapers nordocuments are at our disposal. And vet the repeated interruptions in theBrest-Litovsk negotiations create a suspense which, under presentcircumstances, is no longer bearable. I shall endeavor, therefore, torecall the course and the landmarks of the October revolution, reservingthe right to complete and correct this exposition subsequently in thelight of documents.
What characterized our party almost from the very first period of therevolution, was the conviction that it would ultimately come into powerthrough the logic of events. I do not refer to the theorists of theparty, who, many years before the revolution—even before the revolutionof 1905—as a result of their analysis of class relations in Russia,came to the conclusion that the triumphant development of the revolutionmust inevitably transfer the power to the proletariat, supported by thevast masses of the poorest peasants. The chief basis of this prognosiswas the insignificance of the Russian bourgeois democracy and theconcentrated character of Russian industrialism—which makes of theRussian proletariat a factor of tremendous social importance. Theinsignificance of bourgeois democracy is but the complement of the powerand significance of the proletariat. It is true, the war has deceivedmany on this point, and, first of all, the leading groups of bourgeoisdemocracy themselves. The war has assigned a decisive role in the eventsof the revolution to the army. The old army meant the peasantry. Had therevolution developed more normally—that is, under peacefulcircumstances, as it had in 1912—the proletariat would always have helda dominant position, while the peasant masses would gradually have beentaken in tow by the proletariat and drawn into the whirlpool of therevolution.
But the war produced an altogether different succession of events. Thearmy welded the peasants together, not by a political, but by a militarytie. Before the peasant masses could be drawn together by revolutionarydemands and ideas, they were already organized in regimental staffs,divisions and army corps. The representatives of petty bourgeoisdemocracy, scattered through this army and playing a leading role in it,both in a military and in a conceptual way, were almost completelypermeated with middle-class revolutionary tendencies. The deep socialdiscontent in the masses became more acute and was bound to manifestitself, particularly because of the military shipwreck of Czarism. Theproletariat, as represented in its advanced ranks, began, as soon as therevolution developed, to revive the 1905 tradition and called upon themasses of the people to organize in the form of representativebodies—soviets, consisting of deputies. The army was called upon tosend its r